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1 Introduction
The Event Calculus (EC) [9] is a well-known approach to reasoning about the effects of
a narrative of action occurrences (events) along a time line. This paper describes PEC, an
adaptation of EC able to reason with probabilistic causal knowledge. There are numerous
applications for this kind of probabilistic reasoning, e.g. in modelling medical, environ-
mental, legal and commonsense domains, and in complex activity recognition and security
monitoring. PEC’s main characteristics are: i) it supports EC-style narrative reasoning, ii)
it uses a possible worlds semantics to naturally allow for epistemic extensions, iii) it uses a
tailored action language syntax and semantics, iv) its generality allows in principle for the
use of other models of uncertainty, e.g. Fuzzy Logic [20] or Dempster-Schafer Theory [4],
and v) for a wide subset of domains it has a sound and complete ASP implementation.
Although other formalisms exist for probabilistic reasoning about actions, PEC is, to
our knowledge, the only framework to combine these features. We use the following two
example scenarios to illustrate the main definitions and characteristics of our framework.
Scenario 1 (Coin Toss). A coin initially (instant 0) shows Heads. A robot can attempt
to toss the coin, but there is a small chance that it will fail to pick it up, leaving the coin
unchanged. The robot attempts to toss the coin (instant 1).
Scenario 2 (Antibiotic). A patient has a rash often associated with a bacterial infection, and
can take an antibiotic known to be reasonably effective. Treatment is not always successful,
and if not may still clear the rash. Failed treatment leaves the bacteria resistant. The patient
is treated twice (instants 1 and 3).
Scenario 3 (Keys). Leaving the house without first picking up the keys causes being locked
out. In the context of a daily routine, there is a small chance that a person forgets to pick
up the keys before leaving the house at 7:40 AM.
2 PEC
2.1 Syntax
Definition 1 (Domain Language). A domain language is a tuple L = 〈F ,A,V, vals,I,≤
, 0¯〉 consisting of a finite non-empty set F of fluents, a finite set A of actions, a finite non-
1
empty set V of values such that {⊤,⊥} ⊆ V , a function vals : F∪A → 2V \∅, a non-empty
set I of instants and a minimum element 0¯ ∈ I w.r.t. a total ordering ≤ over I . For A ∈ A
we impose vals(A) = {⊤,⊥}.
Example 1. An appropriate domain language for Scenario 1 would be
LC = 〈FC ,AC ,VC , valsC ,N,≤N, 0〉 where, FC = {Coin}, AC = {Toss},
VC = {⊤,⊥,Heads,Tails}, valsC(Coin) = {Heads,Tails} and valsC(Toss) = {⊤,⊥},
N is the set of natural numbers (including 0), and ≤N is the standard to-
tal ordering between naturals. Scenario 2 could be captured by a language
〈FA,AA,VA, valsA,N,≤N, 0〉 where FA = {Bacteria,Rash}, AA = {TakesMedicine},
VA = {⊤,⊥,Weak,Present,Resistant,Absent}, and valsA is defined by
valsA(Bacteria) = {Weak,Resistant,Absent} and valsA(Rash) = {Present,Absent}.
In what follows, all definitions are with respect to a domain language L =
〈F ,A,V, vals,I,≤, 0¯〉.
We begin by defining what a (fluent) literal and a formula are in this language. Literals
and formulas with time information attached are called i-literals and i-formulas respec-
tively.
Definition 2 (Fluent and Action Literals, i-literals). A fluent literal is an expression of
the form F =V for some F ∈ F and V ∈ vals(F ). A fluent is boolean if vals(F ) =
{⊤,⊥}. An action literal is either A=⊤ or A=⊥. When no ambiguity can arise, Z=⊤
is sometimes abbreviated to Z and Z=⊥ is abbreviated to ¬Z for Z a fluent or action. An
i-literal is an expression of the form [L]@I for some (fluent or action) literal L and some
I ∈ I .
Definition 3 (Formulas, i-formulas). The set of formulas, denoted by Θ, is the closure of
the set of literals under ∧ and ¬ (with ∨ and → being defined as shorthand in the usual
way). The set of i-formulas, denoted by Φ, is the closure of the set of i-literals under ∧
and ¬. We use the shorthand [θ]@I for the i-formula formed from the formula θ and the
instant I by replacing all literals L occurring in θ by [L]@I , e.g. [F =V → F ′=V ′]@3 is
a shorthand for [F =V ]@3→ [F ′=V ′]@3.
Example 2. In Scenario 1 the i-literal [Coin=Heads]@3 indicates that the coin shows
heads at instant 3, while [¬Toss]@2 indicates that the robot does not attempt to toss the coin
at instant 2. In Scenario 2, [Rash=Present]@0∧[Bacteria=Absent∧TakesMedicine]@3 in-
dicates that the patient initially has a rash, and that she takes the medicine and the bacterial
infection is absent at instant 3.
Definition 4 (State, Partial State, Fluent State). A state S is a set of literals, exactly one for
each F ∈ F and A ∈ A. A partial state is a subset X ⊆ S of a state S. Given a partial
state X, we call its subset containing all and only the fluent literals in X a partial fluent
state, and we denote it as X↾F . For a state S we call S↾F a fluent state. We also define
X↾A as the subset ofX containing all and only the action literals inX. The set of all states
is denoted by S , the set of all partial states is denoted by X , and we use S˜ and X˜ to denote
the sets {S↾F | S ∈ S} and {X↾F | X ∈ X} respectively.
Example 3. One of the states we can build with the elements of the do-
main language 〈FA,AA,VA, valsA,N,≤N, 0〉 for Scenario 2 is S
1
A =
{Bacteria=Resistant,Rash=Absent,¬TakesMedicine}. Its associated fluent state is
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S1A↾F = {Bacteria=Resistant,Rash=Absent}. Any arbitrary subset of S
1
A, e.g.
X1A = {Rash=Absent,¬TakesMedicine}, is a partial state, whereas any arbitrary subset
of S1A↾F , e.g. X
1
A↾F = {Rash=Absent}, is a partial fluent state.
Definition 5 (Outcome, Projection Functions). An outcome is a pair of the form (X˜, P+)
for some X˜ ∈ X˜ and P+ ∈ (0, 1]. The two projection functions χ and π are such that
χ((X˜, P+)) = X˜ and π((X˜, P+)) = P+ for any outcome. The set of all outcomes
X˜ × (0, 1] will be denoted by O.
Definition 6 (Weight of a Set of Outcomes). Given a finite set of outcomes
B = {O1, O2, . . . , Om}
we define the weight of O as
π(B) =
m∑
i=1
π(Oi).
Notation 1. In the following, we will generally use:
I, I ′, I1, I
′′, I2, . . . to denote elements of I ,
A,A′, A1, A
′′, A2, . . . to denote elements of A,
F,F ′, F1, F
′′, F2, . . . to denote elements of F ,
V, V ′, V1, V
′′, V2, . . . to denote elements of V ,
θ, θ′, θ1, θ
′′, θ2, . . . to denote formulas,
ϕ,ϕ′, ϕ1, ϕ
′′, ϕ2, . . . to denote i-formulas,
P,P ′, P1, P
′′, P2, . . . to denote real values in [0, 1],
P+, P+1 , P
+
2 , . . . to denote real values in (0, 1],
S, S′, S1, S
′′, S2, . . . to denote elements of S ,
X,X ′,X1,X
′′,X2, . . . to denote elements of X ,
S˜, S˜′, S˜1, S˜
′′, S˜2, . . . to denote elements of S˜ ,
X˜, X˜ ′, X˜1, X˜
′′, X˜2, . . . to denote elements of X˜ ,
O,O′, O1, O
′′, O2, . . . to denote outcomes.
We now introduce the standard propositions of our language: v-propositions are used
to declare which value a fluent may take, c-propositions are used to model the causal rela-
tionships of a domain, i-propositions declare the initial conditions, p-propositions are for
the action occurrences, and h-propositions state that a given i-formula holds.
Definition 7 (v-proposition). A v-proposition has the form
F takes-values {V1, . . . , Vm} (1)
wherem ≥ 1 and {V1, . . . , Vm} = vals(F ).
Definition 8 (c-proposition, Head and Body of a c-proposition). A c-proposition c has the
form
θ causes-one-of {O1, O2, . . . , Om} (2)
where Oi ∈ O, χ(Oi) 6= χ(Oj) when i 6= j, θ is a formula such that θ Herbrand-entails
1
A=⊤ for at least one A ∈ A, and π({O1, . . . , Om}) = 1. body(C) = θ and head(C) =
{O1, . . . , Om} are the body and head of C , respectively. We often omit Oi from head(C)
if χ(Oi) = ∅ (leaving it implicit since π({O1, . . . , Om}) = 1).
1For two formulas θ and θ′ we write that θ Herbrand-entails θ′ if, taking literals as propositions, every
classical Herbrand model of θ is also a Herbrand model of θ′.
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Definition 9 (i-proposition). An i-proposition has the form
initially-one-of {O1, O2, . . . , Om} (3)
where Oi∈O, π({O1, . . . , Om})=1, χ(Oi)∈S˜ , and χ(Oi) 6=χ(Oj) when i 6=j.
Definition 10 (p-proposition). A p-proposition has the form
A performed-at I with-prob P+ (4)
where P+ ∈ (0, 1] and I is such that I < I ′ for some other I ′ ∈ I . When a p-proposition
p has the form (4) we say that p has instant I .
In the following, we will frequently use
A performed-at I
as a shorthand for the p-proposition
A performed-at I with-prob 1.
Notation 2. In the following, we will generally use lowercase letters to denote propositions,
e.g. c, c′, c1, c
′′, c2, . . . will be used for c-propositions.
Definition 11 (Domain Description). A domain description is a finite set D of v-
propositions, c-propositions, p-propositions and i-propositions such that: (i) for any two
distinct c-propositions in D with bodies θ and θ′ respectively, θ does not Herbrand-entail
θ′, (ii) D contains exactly one i-proposition, (iii) D contains exactly one v-proposition for
each F ∈ F and (iv) if a p-proposition “A performed-at I with-prob P ′” belongs to D,
then there is no other p-proposition of the form “A performed-at I with-prob P ′′” for
some P ′′ ∈ (0, 1] that belongs to D.
Definition 12 (Action Narrative). An action narrative is any finite set of p-propositions.
For D a domain description, we define the action narrative narr(D) as the set of all p-
propositions in D.
Example 4. Scenario 1 can be modeled using the following domain description DC :
Coin takes-values {Heads,Tails} (C1)
initially-one-of {({Coin = Heads}, 1)} (C2)
Toss causes-one-of (C3)
{({Coin = Heads}, 0.49),
({Coin = Tails}, 0.49),
(∅, 0.02)}
Toss performed-at 1 (C4)
where (C1) is a v-proposition, (C2) is an i-proposition, (C3) is a c-proposition and (C4) is
a p-proposition.
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Example 5. Scenario 2 can be modeled using the following domain description DA:
Bacteria takes-values {Weak,Resistant,Absent} (A1)
Rash takes-values {Present,Absent} (A2)
initially-one-of (A3)
{({Bacteria = Weak,Rash = Present}, 9/10),
({Bacteria = Absent,Rash = Present}, 1/10)}
TakesMedicine ∧ Bacteria = Weak (A4)
causes-one-of
{({Bacteria = Absent,Rash = Absent}, 7/10),
({Bacteria = Resistant,Rash = Absent}, 1/10),
({Bacteria = Resistant}, 2/10)}
TakesMedicine ∧ Bacteria = Resistant (A5)
causes-one-of
{({Bacteria = Absent,Rash = Absent}, 1/13),
(∅, 12/13)}
TakesMedicine performed-at 1 (A6)
TakesMedicine performed-at 3 (A7)
where (A1) and (A2) are v-propositions, (A3) is an i-proposition, (A4) and (A5) are c-
propositions, (A6) and (A7) are p-propositions.
Example 6. Scenario 3 can be modeled using the following domain description DK :
HasKeys takes-values {⊤,⊥} (K1)
LockedOut takes-values {⊤,⊥} (K2)
Location takes-values {Inside,Outside} (K3)
initially-one-of {({¬HasKeys,¬LockedOut,Location= Inside}, 1)} (K4)
GoOut ∧ ¬HasKeys ∧ Location= Inside (K5)
causes-one-of
{({LockedOut,Location=Outside}, 1)}
GoOut ∧ HasKeys ∧ Location= Inside (K6)
causes-one-of {({Location=Outside}, 1)}
PickupKeys ∧ Location= Inside (K7)
causes-one-of {({HasKeys}, 1)}
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PickupKeys performed-at 7:30 AM with-prob 0.99 (K8)
GoOut performed-at 7:40 AM (K9)
Finally, we introduce h-propositions, whose role is that of being entailed by domain
descriptions:
Definition 13 (h-proposition). An h-proposition has the form
ϕ holds-with-prob P. (5)
for some i-formula ϕ.
For example, we will show in the following sections the formal sense in which DC
entails the h-proposition “[Coin=Heads]@2 holds-with-prob 0.51”.
2.2 Semantics
For the remainder of this paper, D is an arbitrary domain description.
Definition 14 (Worlds). A world is a functionW : I → S . The set of all worlds is denoted
byW .
Notation 3. In the following, we will useW,W ′,W ′′,W1,W2, . . . to denote worlds.
Definition 15 (Satisfaction of an i-formula, Logical Consequence for i-formulas). Given a
world W and a literal L, W satisfies an i-formula [L]@I , written W ||= [L]@I , iff L ∈
W (I)2. Otherwise we write W ||6= [L]@I . The definition of ||= is recursively extended
for arbitrary i-formulas as follows: if ϕ and ϕ′ are i-formulas, we write W ||= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff
W ||= ϕ and W ||=′, and W ||= ¬ϕ iff W ||6= ϕ. ∨ and→ are taken as shorthand in the
usual way. Given a (possibly empty) set ∆ of i-formulas, we write W ||= ∆ iff W ||= ψ
for all ψ ∈ ∆. Given an i-formula ϕ and a set ∆ of i-formulas we write ∆ ||= ϕ if for all
W ∈ W such that W ||= ∆, W ||= ϕ also holds. For two i-formulas ψ and ϕ, we use
ψ ||= ϕ as a shorthand for {ψ} ||= ϕ, and ||= ϕ as a shorthand for ∅ ||= ϕ.
Example 7. Three worlds for Scenario 1 can be specified as follows:
W1(0) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊥},
W1(1) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊤},
W1(I) = {Coin = Tails, Toss = ⊥} for all I ≥ 2.
W2(0) = {Coin = Tails, Toss = ⊥},
W2(1) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊥},
W2(I) = {Coin = Tails, Toss = ⊤} for all I ≥ 2.
W3(0) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊥},
W3(1) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊤},
W3(I) = {Coin = Heads, Toss = ⊥} for all I ≥ 2.
2The symbols ||= and ||6= should not be confused with |= and 6|=which we use for the classical propositional
entailment
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Intuitively, W1 and W3 match the domain description in Example 4 as they represent
a coherent history of what could have happened in Scenario 1, whereas W2 does not (e.g.,
changes occur when no action is performed, an infinite number of actions is being per-
formed, etc. . . ). This intuition will be made precise in what follows.
Since worlds are functions from instants to states, they can conveniently be depicted as
timelines as follows:
W1
i
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊥}
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊤}
{Coin = Tails,
Toss = ⊥}
0 1 ≥ 2
W2
i
{Coin = Tails,
Toss = ⊥}
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊥}
{Coin = Tails,
Toss = ⊤}
0 1 ≥ 2
W3
i
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊥}
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊤}
{Coin = Heads,
Toss = ⊥}
0 1 ≥ 2
Definition 16 (Closed World Assumption for Actions). A world W is said to satisfy the
closed world assumption for actions (or CWA for actions, for short) w.r.t. D if it satisfies
the following condition: for all A ∈ A and I ∈ I , if W ||= [A]@I then there exists some
P+ ∈ (0, 1] such that “A performed-at I with-prob P+” is in D. Furthermore, if for
some A ∈ A and I ∈ I the p-proposition “A performed-at I with-prob 1” is in D then it
must be the case thatW ||= [A]@I .
Example 8. Let W1, W2 and W3 be the worlds in Example 7, and let DC be the domain
description in Example 4. WorldW1 satisfies CWA for actions w.r.t. DC as Toss ∈W1(I)
if and only if I = 1, which is consistent with (C4) being the only p-proposition in DC .
CWA is not satisfied by W2 as ¬Toss ∈ W2(1), i.e. W2 ||= [¬Toss]@1, but this is not
consistent with (C4). W3 satisfies CWA for actions for the same reason asW1.
Definition 17 (Cause Occurrence). Let θ be the body of a c-proposition c in a domain
description D and I ∈ I . If W ||= [θ]@I then we say that that a cause occurs at instant
I in W w.r.t. to D, and that the c-proposition c is activated at I in W w.r.t. D. We
write occD(W ) for the set {I ∈ I | a cause occurs at I inW}. The function cpropD with
domain {(W, I) | W ∈ W, I ∈ occD(W )} is defined for instants I in its domain as
cpropD(W, I) = c where c is the (unique) c-proposition activated at I in worldW .
Example 9. Let DC be as in Example 4 and W1, W2 and W3 be as in Example 7.
Since W1 ||= [Toss]@I if and only if I = 1 (and similarly for W3), we derive that
occDC (W1) = occDC (W3) = {1}, with cpropDC (W1, 1) = cpropDC (W3, 1) = (C3).
For W2, occDC (W2) is defined as {I | I ∈ N, I ≥ 2} with cpropDC (W2, I) = (C3) for
I ≥ 2.
Definition 18 (Initial Choice). LetD be a domain description and the unique i-proposition
in D be of the form (3). Each O1, O2, . . . , Om is called an initial choice w.r.t. D.
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Definition 19 (Effect Choice). Let W be a world and D a domain description. An effect
choice for W w.r.t. D is a function ec : occD(W ) → O such that for all instants I ∈
occD(W ), ec(I) ∈ head(cpropD(W, I)).
Example 10. Let DC be as in Example 4 and W1, W2 and W3 be as in Example 7. The
only initial choice w.r.t. DC is ic1 = ({Coin = Heads}, 1). The only effect choices forW1
w.r.t. DC are ec1(1) = ({Coin = Tails}, 49/100), ec2(1) = ({Coin = Heads}, 49/100)
and ec3(1) = (∅, 2/100). Notice that since occDC (W1) = occDC (W3), all the effect
choices forW1 are also effect choices forW3. There are an (uncountably) infinite number
of effect choices for W2 w.r.t. DC , each one mapping each instant I ≥ 2 to ({Coin =
Heads}, 49/100), ({Coin = Tails}, 49/100) or (∅, 2/100).
Definition 20 (Initial Condition). A world W is said to satisfy the initial condition w.r.t.
D if there exists an initial choice ic w.r.t. D such that W (0¯)↾F = χ(ic). If a world W
satisfies the initial condition w.r.t. D for some initial choice ic, then we say that W and ic
are consistent with each other w.r.t. D.
Example 11. Let DC be as in Example 4, and W1, W2 and W3 be as in 7. Since ic1 =
({Coin = Heads}, 1) is the only initial choice w.r.t. DC as outlined in Example 10, W1
andW3 are consistent w.r.t. DC with it, sinceW1(0)↾F =W3(0)↾F = χ(ic1). Therefore,
W1 andW3 satisfy the initial condition w.r.t. DC . SinceW2(0)↾F 6= χ(ic1),W2 does not
satisfy the initial condition.
Definition 21 (Intervals). Given two instants I and I ′ such that I ≤ I ′, the intervals [I, I ′],
[I, I ′), (I, I ′] and (I, I ′) are defined in the standard way w.r.t. the total order ≤. We also
use [I,+∞) as shorthand for the set {I ′ | I ′ ∈ I, I ′ ≥ I}, (−∞, I] as shorthand for
{I ′ | I ′ ∈ I, I ′ ≤ I}, (I,+∞) as a shorthand for [I,∞) \ {I} and (−∞, I) as a shorthand
for (−∞, I] \ {I}.
Definition 22 (Fluent State Update). Given a fluent state S˜ and a partial fluent state X˜, the
update of S˜ w.r.t. X˜ , written S˜ ⊕ X˜ , is the fluent state (S˜ ⊖ X˜) ∪ X˜ , where S˜ ⊖ X˜ is
the partial fluent state formed by removing all fluent literals from S˜ of the form F = V
for some F and V ′ such that F = V ′ ∈ X˜ . The operator ⊕ is left-associative, so e.g.
S˜ ⊕ X˜ ⊕ X˜ ′ is understood as ((S˜ ⊕ X˜)⊕ X˜ ′).
Definition 23 (Justified Change). A world W is said to satisfy the justified change condi-
tion w.r.t. D if and only if there exists an effect choice ec w.r.t. D such that for all instants
I and I ′ with I < I ′, ec maps the possibly empty set of instants in occD(W ) ∩ [I, I
′) =
{I1, . . . , In} to O1, O2, . . . , On respectively, where I1, . . . , In are ordered w.r.t. ≤, and
W (I ′)↾F = (W (I)↾F)⊕ χ(O1)⊕ χ(O2)⊕ · · · ⊕ χ(On) (6)
If a world W satisfies the justified change condition for some effect choice ec, W and ec
are said to be consistent with each other w.r.t. D.
Example 12. Let DC be as in Example 4,W1,W2 be as in Example 7, and ec1 be defined
as in Example 10.
For any two instants I , I ′ ∈ N with I < I ′, if [I, I ′) ∩ occDC (W1) = ∅ then clearly
W1(I
′)↾F =W1(I)↾F . Otherwise, if [I, I
′)∩occDC (W1) 6= ∅, i.e. [I, I
′)∩occDC (W1) =
{1} then (6) holds as W1(I)↾F ⊕ χ(ec1(1)) = {Coin = Tails} = W (I
′)↾F . So the
justified change condition w.r.t. DC is satisfied byW1.
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For W to satisfy the justified change condition w.r.t. DC , equation (6) would require
W2(0)↾F = W2(1)↾F (as occDC (W2) ∩ [1, 2) = ∅), but this is not the case. Hence, W2
does not satisfy the justified change condition w.r.t. DC .
Definition 24 (Well-behaved Worlds). A world is said to be well-behaved w.r.t. D if it
satisfies CWA for actions, the initial condition and the justified change condition w.r.t. D.
We denote the set of well-behaved worlds w.r.t. D withWD.
Example 13. Let DC be as in Example 4 and W1, W2 be as in Example 7. W1 is well-
behaved as it satisfies CWA (see Example 8), the initial condition (see Example 11) and the
justified change condition (see Example 12) w.r.t. DC . W2 is not well-behaved as it fails to
satisfy any of these conditions.
Definition 25 (Candidate Trace, Trace). A candidate trace is a function tr : dom(tr) ∪
{ ⊲⊳} → O where dom(tr) ⊆ I and ⊲⊳ is a new symbol such that ⊲⊳ /∈ I . For read-
ability, we will sometimes write 〈tr( ⊲⊳)@ ⊲⊳, tr(I1)@I1, . . . , tr(Im)@Im〉 where dom(tr) =
{I1, . . . , Im} and the instants are ordered w.r.t. ≤.
IfW is well-behaved w.r.t. D and is consistent with the initial choice ic and the effect
choice ec w.r.t. D, then tr is said to be a trace of W w.r.t. D if dom(tr) = occD(W ) and
tr( ⊲⊳) = ic and for all I ∈ dom(tr), tr(I) = ec(I) and in this case we will sometimes write
tr = (ic, ec).
For anyW ∈ W , we write TRWD for the set of all traces ofW w.r.t. D, and notice that
TRWD 6= ∅ if and only ifW is well-behaved.
A well-behaved world can have multiple traces, as shown in the following example.
Example 14. Let DC be as in Example 4, W3 be as in Example 7 and ic1, ec2, ec3 be
as defined in Example 10. World W3 has two distinct traces, tr
′
3 = (ic1, ec2) and tr
′′
3 =
(ic1, ec3), which disagree on the effect choice: in one case the robot manages to toss the
coin producing Coin = Heads as a result (i.e., tr′3(1) = ({Coin = Heads}, 0.49)) whereas
in the other case the robot fails to grab the coin (i.e., tr′′3(1) = (∅, 0.02)) leaving Coin =
Heads to hold. These two traces are also the only traces of this world w.r.t. DC .
However, for some candidate traces tr there exists no well-behaved worldW such that
tr is a trace ofW . We now generalise Definition 25 to domain descriptions:
Definition 26 (Trace of a Domain Description). Given a candidate trace tr, if there exists
a well-behaved worldW w.r.t. D such that tr is a trace ofW w.r.t. D, then tr is said to be
a trace of D.
Definition 27 (Evaluation of a Trace). Let tr be a candidate trace. The evaluation of tr,
written ǫ(tr), is defined as:
ǫ(tr) = π(tr( ⊲⊳)) ·
∏
I∈dom(tr)
π(tr(I)) (7)
Definition 28 (Evaluation of a Narrative). Given a p-proposition p of the form
“A performed-at I with-prob P+”, we define the evaluation of p w.r.t. W as
ǫ(p,W ) =
{
P+ ifW ||= [A]@I
1− P+ otherwise
(8)
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For an action narrative N (see Definition 12) we extend the previous definition to:
ǫ(N,W ) =
∏
p∈N
ǫ(p,W ). (9)
and write ǫD(W ) as a shorthand for ǫ(narr(D),W ). Conventionally, ǫ(N,W ) = 1 when
N = ∅.
Definition 29 ([0, 1]-interpretation). A [0,1]-interpretation is a function fromW to [0, 1].
Definition 30 (Model). A model of a domain description D is a [0, 1]-interpretation MD
such that
1. IfW ∈ W is not well-behaved w.r.t. D,
MD(W ) = 0, (10)
2. IfW ∈ W is well-behaved w.r.t. D,
MD(W ) = ǫD(W ) ·
∑
tr∈TRWD
ǫ(tr). (11)
Example 15. Let DC be as in Example 4 and W3 be as Example 7. As discussed in
Example 14, W3 has exactly two traces tr
′
3 = (ic1, ec2) and tr
′′
3 = (ic1, ec3). Equations
(7) and (11) yield:
MDC (3) = ǫ(tr
′
3) + ǫ(tr
′′
3) = 0.49 + 0.02 = 0.51
Proposition 1. A domain description D has a unique model.
Proof. This can be derived from Definition 30 by considering that MD(W ) is calculated
as a product of functions of the states ofW .
Definition 31. We extend the modelMD to a functionM
∗
D : Φ→ [0, 1] over i-formulas in
the following way:
M∗D(ϕ) =
∑
W ||=ϕ
MD(W ).
Definition 32 (Entailment for Domain Descriptions). Given a domain description D and
an i-formula ϕ, we say that the h-proposition “ϕ holds-with-prob P” is entailed by D iff
M∗D(ϕ) = P .
Example 16. For DC as in Example 4, the only well-behaved world W such that W ||=
[Coin=Heads]@2 isW3. Definition 31 and Example 15 yield
M∗DC ([Coin=Heads]@2) =MDC (W3) = 0.51.
The reader can verify that [Coin=Heads]@0 yields
M∗DC ([Coin=Heads]@0) =MDC (W1) +MDC (W3) = 1
and from this we can derive that DC entails the two following h-propositions:
[Coin=Heads]@2 holds-with-prob 0.51,
[Coin=Heads]@0 holds-with-prob 1.
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Example 17. Let DK be as in Example 6. Assuming 0¯ = 7:30 AM, the only two well-
behaved worlds w.r.t. DK are:
W1
i
{¬HasKeys,
¬LockedOut,
Location= Inside,
PickupKeys,
¬GoOut}
{HasKeys,
¬LockedOut,
Location= Inside,
¬PickupKeys,
GoOut}
{HasKeys,
¬LockedOut,
Location=Outside,
¬PickupKeys,
¬GoOut}
7:30 AM 7:40 AM >7:40 AM
W2
i
{¬HasKeys,
¬LockedOut,
Location= Inside,
¬PickupKeys,
¬GoOut}
{¬HasKeys,
¬LockedOut,
Location= Inside,
¬PickupKeys,
GoOut}
{¬HasKeys,
LockedOut,
Location=Outside,
¬PickupKeys,
¬GoOut}
7:30 AM 7:40 AM >7:40 AM
Since both actions GoOut and PickupKeys have definite effects (i.e., outcomes in the
head of the corresponding c-propositions have probability equal to 1), the only significant
factors in the calculation ofMDK are those given by the evaluation of the action narrative:
MDK (W1) = ǫDK (W1) = 0.99
MDK (W2) = ǫDK (W2) = 0.01
implying that DK entails the following propositions:
[LockedOut]@9AM holds-with-prob 0.01,
[HasKeys]@9AM holds-with-prob 0.99.
2.3 Properties of a model
We now introduce the concept of a probability function, adapted from [15]:
Definition 33 (Probability Function, Conditional Probability). A probability function (over
i-formulas) is a function p : Φ→ [0, 1] such that:
1. if ||= ϕ, then p(ϕ) = 1,
2. if ϕ ||= ¬ψ for two i-formulas ϕ and ψ, then p(ϕ ∨ ψ) = p(ϕ) + p(ψ).
The associated conditional probability of ϕ given ψ is defined as
p(ϕ | ψ) =
p(ϕ ∧ ψ)
p(ψ)
(12)
for p(ψ) 6= 0.
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Wewill show thatM∗D is a probability function. To prove this, first we need to introduce
some auxiliary definitions:
Definition 34 (Restricted Domain Description). IfD is a domain description, we denote by
D≤I the domain description obtained from D by removing all the p-propositions occurring
at instants > I , and similarly we denote by D<I the domain description obtained from D
by removing all the p-propositions occurring at instants ≥ I . Finally, we denote by D∅ the
domain description obtained from D by removing all p-propositions, i.e. D
<0¯.
Definition 35 (Fluent-indistinguishability, Indistinguishability). A world W is said to be
fluent-indistinguishable from W ′ up to an instant I if and only if W (I ′)↾F = W ′(I ′)↾F
for all instants I ′ such that I ′ ≤ I . W is said to be indistinguishable from W ′ up to an
instant I if and only if it is fluent indistinguishable fromW ′ up to I and if for all I ′ < I it
also satisfies A ∈W (I ′) if and only if A ∈W ′(I ′).
In the following example, we illustrate the two concepts of restricted domain descrip-
tion and indistinguishability:
Example 18. Let D′ be the domain description obtained from DC as in Example 4 by
adding the following p-proposition:
Toss performed-at 2 (C5)
and consider the following well-behaved world w.r.t. D′:
W ′(0) = {Coin = Heads,¬Toss},
W ′(1) =W ′(2) = {Coin = Heads,Toss},
W ′(I) = {Coin = Tails,¬Toss} for all I > 2
W ′ has exactly two traces tr′ = 〈({Coin = Heads}, 1)@ ⊲⊳, ({Coin =
Heads}, 0.49)@1, ({Coin = Tails}, 0.49)@2〉 and tr′′ = 〈({Coin =
Heads}, 1)@ ⊲⊳, (∅, 0.02)@1, ({Coin = Heads}, 0.49)@2〉.
Consider D′<2 and notice that it coincides with DC as in the previous examples. There
is a unique well-behaved world w.r.t. DC that is indistinguishable from W
′ up to 2, and
this world isW3 as in Example 7.
Definition 36 (Transition Set, Transition Function). Given a domain description D, a state
S and a fluent state S˜′, the transition set tsetD(S, S˜
′) is defined as follows: if D contains a
(unique) c-proposition c such that S Herbrand-entails body(c), then tsetD(S, S˜
′) = {O ∈
head(c) | (S↾F) ⊕ χ(O) = S˜′} if there is no such c-proposition and S↾F = S˜′ then
tset(S, S˜′) = {(∅, 1)}; otherwise, tsetD(S, S˜
′) = ∅.
The transition function for a domain description D is the function tD : S × S˜ → [0, 1]
defined by tD(S, S˜
′) = π(tsetD(S, S˜
′)) (recall Definition 6 for the meaning of π in this
case).
Informally, the transition function gives the probability of moving from state S to the
fluent state S˜′ within D, independently of its particular narrative.
The transition function for the coin toss example can be visualised as in Figure 1, where
the nodes represent fluent states (in this case we have two nodes H and T standing for the
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{Toss}, 0.49
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Figure 1: Transition function for the Coin Toss domain.
fluent states {Coin = Heads} and {Coin = Tails} respectively), and if p = tD(S, S˜
′) for
some state S and some fluent state S˜′, then there is an arrow from a node representing S↾F
to a node representing S˜′ which is labelled S↾A, p. The arrow is omitted in some trivial
cases (for instance when the set of actions is empty).
Similarly, the transition function for the antibiotic domain can be pictured as in Figure
2.
where RPBR is the fluent state {Rash = Present,Bacteria = Resistant}, RPBW is
the fluent state {Rash = Present,Bacteria = Weak}, RABA is the fluent state {Rash =
Absent,Bacteria = Absent}, RABR is the fluent state {Rash = Absent,Bacteria =
Resistant}, and TM = {TakesMedicine}.
The transition function can be conveniently used to express MD(W ) in terms of the
model of a well-behaved world w.r.t. an appropriately restricted domain description:
Proposition 2. Let D be an arbitrary domain description and W be a world such that
occD(W ) = {I1, . . . , In} 6= ∅ where I1, . . . , In are ordered w.r.t. ≤, and let c be the c-
proposition activated in W at In w.r.t. D. Then W is well-behaved w.r.t. D if and only
if (i) there exists a unique world W ′ well-behaved w.r.t. D<In which is indistinguishable
fromW up to In, (ii) for all I > In,W (I)↾F = S˜
W
>In
where S˜W>In = (W (In)↾F)⊕ χ(O)
for some outcome O ∈ head(c) , and (iii)W satisfies CWA for actions w.r.t. D.
Furthermore, for S˜W>In the unique fluent state taken byW at instants I > In:
MD(W ) =
ǫD(W )
ǫD<In (W
′)
·MD<In (W
′) · tD(W (In), S˜
W
>In) (13)
Proof. “Only if” subproof. Let W be well-behaved w.r.t. D. Let tr =
〈tr( ⊲⊳)@ ⊲⊳, tr(I1)@I1, . . . , tr(In)@In〉 be an arbitrary trace of W w.r.t. D and consider
the candidate trace tr′ = 〈tr( ⊲⊳)@ ⊲⊳, tr(I1)@I1, . . . , tr(In−1)@In−1〉.
Since W is well-behaved w.r.t. D, since D and D<In differ only by one p-proposition
occurring at In, and since tr
′ does not mention any instant strictly greater than In−1, it
is possible to construct a world W ′ which has trace tr′ w.r.t. D<In and which is fluent-
indistinguishable fromW up to instant In by simply considering thatW
′(0¯) = χ(tr′( ⊲⊳)) =
W (0¯) makes the Initial Condition satisfied w.r.t. D<In as both D and D<In share the same
i-proposition, and a similar argument applies to the Justified Change Condition w.r.t. D<In .
Well-behavedness w.r.t. D and D<In guarantees that for all instants I ≤ In, W (I)↾F =
tr( ⊲⊳) ⊕ · · · ⊕ tr(Ii) = tr
′( ⊲⊳) ⊕ · · · ⊕ tr′(Ii) = W
′(I)↾F for some i < n, hence W
is fluent-indistinguishable from W ′ up to In. Such a W
′ might not be unique, but if we
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Figure 2: Transition function for the Antibiotic domain.
choose W ′ as to satisfy A ∈ W (I) ⇔ A ∈ W ′(I) for all I < In then the uniqueness of
W ′ is guaranteed. Then, (i) holds. SinceW is well-behaved w.r.t. D and In is the greatest
element in occD, χ(tr(In)) = O for some O ∈ head(c) and Justified Change implies
W (I)↾F = (W (In)↾F) ⊕ χ(tr(In)) for all I > In, and if we let S˜
W
>In
be such unique
fluent state (ii) is also satisfied. Finally, (iii) holds by definition of well-behavedness w.r.t.
D.
“If” subproof. Let W ′ be a well-behaved world w.r.t. D<In and let occD<In (W
′) =
{I1, . . . , In−1}. Let tr
′ = 〈tr( ⊲⊳)@ ⊲⊳, tr(I1)@I1, . . . , tr(In−1)@In−1〉 be a trace of W
′
w.r.t. DIn and construct the candidate trace tr = 〈tr( ⊲
⊳)@ ⊲⊳, tr(I1)@I1, . . . , O@In〉 for the
outcome O ∈ head(c) such that (W (I)↾F) = (W (In)↾F) ⊕ χ(O) for all I > In. Since
W ′ is well-behaved w.r.t. D<In and indistinguishable from W up to In by hypothesis (i),
we derive that tr is a trace ofW ′ w.r.t. D by noticing again that both D and D<In share the
same i-proposition, and a similarly arguments applies for the Justified Change Condition
w.r.t. D (also using hypothesis (ii)). SinceW also satisfies CWA for actions by hypothesis
(iii), it is well-behaved.
“Furthermore” subproof. Let S˜W>In and c be as in the statement of the proposition.
The above proof implies that for any trace tr of W w.r.t. D this trace can be constructed
from a trace tr′ ofW ′ by letting tr(Ii) = tr
′(Ii) for i < In and tr(In) = χ(O) for some
O ∈ head(c) such that S˜W>In = (W (In)↾F) ⊕ χ(O) (and notice that there is at least such
an outcome O sinceW is well-behaved), i.e. for some O ∈ tsetD(W (In), S˜
W
>In
).
Definition 30 now implies
14
MD(W ) = ǫD(W ) ·
∑
tr∈TRWD
ǫ(tr)
= ǫD<In (W
′) ·
ǫD(W )
ǫD<In (W
′)
· π(tsetD(W (In), S˜
W
>In
)) ·
∑
tr′∈TRW
′
D<In
ǫ(tr′)
=
ǫD(W )
ǫD<In (W
′)
· tD(W (In), S˜
W
>In
) ·

ǫD<In (W ′) ·∑
tr′∈TRW
′
D<In
ǫ(tr′)


=
ǫD(W )
ǫD<In (W
′)
· tD(W (In), S˜
W
>In) ·MD<In (W
′).
which is well defined since ǫ(N,W ) > 0 for any action narrative N and worldW .
Corollary 1. Let D be any domain description and let I be any instant. Then W is well-
behaved w.r.t. D≤I if and only if (i) there exists a unique world W
′ well-behaved w.r.t.
D<I which is indistinguishable from W up to I , (ii) for all I
′ > I thenW (I ′)↾F = S˜W>In
where S˜W>In = (W (I)↾F)⊕χ(O) for some outcome O ∈ head(c) if I ∈ occD≤I (W ), and
S˜W>In =W (I)↾F otherwise, and (iii)W satisfies CWA for actions w.r.t. D≤I .
Furthermore, for S˜W>In the unique fluent state taken byW at instants I > In:
MD≤I (W ) =
ǫD≤I (W )
ǫD<I (W
′)
·MD<I (W
′) · tD(W (I), S˜
W
>I) (14)
Proof. If I ∈ occD≤I (W ) then the corollary follows directly from Proposition 2 since the
domain description D≤I satisfies all of its hypotheses. If I /∈ occD≤I (W ) then no change
of state occurs at I in W , i.e. W (I)↾F = W (I ′)↾F = S˜W>I for any I
′ > I , and Equation
(14) holds for tD(W (I), S˜
W
>I) = 1.
Lemma 1. For any D and any state S,∑
S˜′∈S˜
tD(S, S˜
′) = 1.
Proof. We prove this by cases:
Case 1. If there is no c-proposition c such that S Herbrand-entails body(c), then it
follows from Definition 36 that∑
S˜′∈S˜
tD(S, S˜
′) = tD(S, S↾F) = π((∅, 1)) = 1
which is what we want.
Case 2. Let c be the unique c-proposition S Herbrand-entails body(c). Then, applying
the definition of tD from Definition 36 gives∑
S˜′∈S˜
tD(S, S˜
′) =
∑
S˜′∈S˜
π(tsetD(S, S˜
′)) (15)
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Notice that for a fixed outcome O, it is impossible to have O ∈ tsetD(S, S˜
′) and O ∈
tsetD(S, S˜
′′) for two distinct fluent states S˜′, S˜′′ as this would imply S˜′ = (S↾F)⊕χ(O) =
S˜′′. Hence it is sufficient to show that {O ∈ tsetD(S, S˜
′) | S˜′ ∈ S˜} = head(c), as this
implies that the sum (15) equals 1 since π(head(c)) = 1 by definition of a c-proposition.
By definition of a transition set, {O ∈ tsetD(S, S˜
′) | S˜′ ∈ S˜} ⊆ head(c). Conversely,
for any O ∈ head(c), O ∈ tsetD(S, S˜
′) for S˜′ = (S↾F) ⊕ χ(O), hence head(c) ⊆ {O ∈
tsetD(S, S˜
′) | S˜′ ∈ S˜} which ends the proof of lemma.
Lemma 2. Let D be any domain description, I be any instant and NI be the possibly
empty action narrative that contains exactly those p-propositions in D that occur at I . Let
W1, . . . ,Wm be well-behaved worlds w.r.t. D such that Wi(I)↾F = Wj(I)↾F for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and which represent all the equivalence classes such thatW is equivalent to
W ′ if and only ifW (I) =W ′(I). Then,
m∑
j=1
ǫ(NI ,Wj) = 1
Proof. Let p1, . . . , pk be the p-propositions in NI (possibly none, in which case k = 0)
that have probabilities strictly less than 1 attached. Then, there are at least 2k well-behaved
worlds w.r.t. D satisfyingW (I)↾F =W ′(I)↾F , of whichW1, . . . ,Wm are representatives
of each possible assignment of actions to {⊤,⊥}. Therefore, if we let pi have the form
“Ai performed-at I with-prob Pi” for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the sum
∑m
j=1 ǫ(NI ,Wj) evaluates
to:
P1 · P2 . . . Pk + P1 · P2 . . . (1− Pk) + · · ·+ (1− P1) · (1− P2) . . . (1− Pk) = 1
We can now prove the central property ofM∗:
Proposition 3. Given a model MD of a domain description D, its extension to M
∗
D is a
probability function.
Proof. We show that for any domain description, requirements 1 and 2 as in Definition 33
are always satisfied by a model of that domain description.
Proof of requirement 1. We need to show that for any ψ such that W ||= ψ for all
worldsW ,
M∗D(ψ) =
∑
W∈W
MD(W ) =
∑
W∈WD
MD(W ) = 1. (16)
where the second equality is guaranteed by the fact that MD(W ) = 0 when W is not
well-behaved.
For a p-proposition p we define hasInstant(p) as the instant p has, and for an action
narrative N we extend this to:
hasInstants(N) =
⋃
p∈N
hasInstant(p)
We prove (16) by induction on hasInstants(narr(D)) = {I1, . . . , In} where I1, . . . , In
are ordered w.r.t. ≤. Notice that D≤In = D.
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Base case. We consider D∅ first. Since there are no p-propositions in D∅,
hasInstants(D∅) = ∅, ǫD∅(W ) = ∅ for all worldsW , and the sum (16) becomes:
M∗D∅(ψ) =
∑
W∈WD∅

 ∑
tr∈TRWD∅
π(tr( ⊲⊳))

 (17)
Let {O1, . . . , Om} be the outcomes occurring in the only i-proposition ofD∅. We prove
that the well-behaved worlds w.r.t. D∅ are exactly those W s taking the form W (I)↾F =
χ(Oi) and ¬A ∈W (I) for all instants I and all action symbols A.
If W has this form, then it satisfies CWA (as there are no p-propositions in D∅, and
this is consistent with ¬A ∈ W (I) for all I and A), it satisfies the initial condition w.r.t.
D∅ as Oi is an initial choice w.r.t. D∅ and W (0¯)↾F = χ(Oi) by definition, and finally it
also satisfies the justified change condition in the form (6) as occD∅(W ) = ∅, which in turn
forces W (I)↾F = W (I ′)↾F for all I and I ′. The fact that ifW is well-behaved then it is
of the form above is a simple inversion of the previous chain of implications.
Notice that each of these well-behaved worlds is consistent with a unique trace 〈Oi@ ⊲⊳〉
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and let Wi denote the world having trace 〈Oi@ ⊲⊳〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Hence we can writeWD∅ = {W1, . . . ,Wm}. For suchWi,∑
tr∈TR
Wi
D∅
π(tr( ⊲⊳)) = π(Oi)
and (17) evaluates to:
M∗D∅(ψ) =
∑
Wi∈WD∅
π(Oi) =
m∑
i=1
π(Oi) = 1 (18)
as π({O1, . . . , Om}) = 1 by Definition 9 of an i-proposition.
Inductive step. Assume that M∗D<Ii
(ψ) = 1 for some i ≤ n. We prove that
M∗D≤Ii
(ψ) = 1.
Let [W ′]ID be the set of well-behaved worlds w.r.t. D that are indistinguishable from
W ′ up to I . Corollary 1 and Lemma 1 together with the inductive hypothesis allow us to
turn Equation (16) into:
M∗D≤Ii
(ψ) =
∑
W∈WD≤Ii
MD≤Ii (W )
Cor.1
=
∑
W ′∈WD<Ii
∑
W∈[W ′]
Ii
D≤Ii
ǫD≤Ii (W )
ǫD<Ii (W
′)
·MD<Ii (W
′) · tD(W (Ii), S˜
W
>Ii
)
=
∑
W ′∈WD<Ii
MD<Ii (W
′)
∑
W∈[W ′]
Ii
D≤Ii
ǫD≤Ii (W )
ǫD<Ii (W
′)
· tD(W (Ii), S˜
W
>Ii
)
According to Corollary 1 every world in [W ′]IiD≤Ii
can be reconstructed from its state
at instant Ii and the unique state S˜
′ that it takes at instants strictly greater than Ii. Consider
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the equivalence relation such that two well-behaved worlds W and W ′ w.r.t. D≤Ii are
equivalent if and only if W (Ii) = W
′(Ii), and let W1, . . . ,Wm be representatives of all
the equivalence classes. Then, the above chain of equalities continues as follows:
=
∑
W ′∈WD<Ii
MD<Ii (W
′)
m∑
j=1
ǫD≤Ii (Wj)
ǫD<Ii (W
′)
·
∑
S˜′∈S˜
tD(Wj(Ii), S˜
′)
Lem.1
=
∑
W ′∈WD<Ii
MD<Ii (W
′)
m∑
j=1
ǫD≤Ii (Wj)
ǫD<Ii (W
′)
Lem.2
=
∑
W ′∈WD<Ii
MD<Ii (W
′)
Ind.Hyp.
= 1
Proof of requirement 2. Letϕ and ψ be two i-formulas such that ϕ ||= ¬ψ. Obviously,
since ϕ ||= ¬ψ if for someW ∈ W ,W ||= ϕ, thenW ||6= ψ and vice-versa, hence
M∗D(ϕ ∨ ψ) =
∑
W ||=ϕ∨ψ
MD(W ) =
∑
W ||=ϕ
MD(W ) +
∑
W ||=ψ
MD(W ) =M
∗
D(ϕ) +M
∗
D(ψ).
An immediate consequence of the previous proposition is the following one:
Corollary 2. For any given domain description D,WD 6= ∅.
2.4 Example entailments
The following are example entailments from the formalisation of Scenarios 1, 2 and 3.
DC as in Example 4 entails, among others:
⊤ holds-with-prob 1 (||=C1)
[Coin = Tails]@0 holds-with-prob 0 (||=C2)
[Toss = ⊤]@1 holds-with-prob 1 (||=C3)
[Coin = Heads]@2 holds-with-prob 0.51 (||=C4)
[Coin = Heads]@1 ∧ [Coin = Tails]@3 (||=C5)
holds-with-prob 0.49
where ⊤ is any tautological i-formula (i.e.,W ||= ⊤ for allW ∈ W).
The following h-propositions are entailed by DA:
[Bacteria = Weak]@0 holds-with-prob 0.9 (||=A1)
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[Bacteria = Weak ∧ Rash = Absent]@0 (||=A2)
holds-with-prob 0
[Bacteria = Resistant]@2 holds-with-prob 0.27 (||=A3)
[Rash = Absent]@4 holds-with-prob 0.733846 (||=A4)
[Bacteria = Absent ∧ Rash = Absent]@4 (||=A5)
holds-with-prob 0.650769
Notice that from (||=A4) and (||=A5) we can calculate the conditional probability that
the medicine has cured the infection at instant 4, i.e. [Bacteria = Absent]@4, given that no
sign of rash is visible at the end of the treatment, i.e. [Rash = Absent]@4. Applying (12)
gives that this probability equals 0.650769/0.733846 ≈ 0.887.
Finally, the following h-propositions are entailed by DK :
[LockedOut]@8AM holds-with-prob 0.01, (||=K1)
[HasKeys]@9AM holds-with-prob 0.99, (||=K2)
[PickupKeys]@7:40AM holds-with-prob 0.99. (||=K3)
3 Translation
To aid the reader’s intuition, we outline the translation of a domain description D into an
answer set program. The idea is that of generating all the traces of a domain description
as distinct stable models of the translated domain description. These traces can then be
processed by an external tool such as AWK in order to calculate the probability of given
queries.
In the following, we restrict the domain language to be such that I is a finite interval
{0, 1, . . . ,maxinst} of N, with 0¯ = 0 and ≤=≤N being the usual ordering relation between
naturals.
3.1 Translation of the domain-dependent part
We start by introducing the full translation of the coin domain description from Example 4.
Example 19 (Translation of the Coin Toss Domain). Let DC be as in Example 4. The
translation of DC results in the following set of clauses:
fluent(coin). (TC0)
action(toss).
instant(0..maxinst).
possVal(coin, heads). (TC1)
possVal(coin, tails).
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belongsTo((coin, heads), id01). (TC2)
initialCondition((id01, 1)).
belongsTo((coin, heads), id11). (TC3.1)
causesOutcome((id11, 49/100), I) ←
holds(((toss, true), I)).
belongsTo((coin, tails), id12). (TC3.2)
causesOutcome((id12, 49/100), I) ←
holds(((toss, true), I)).
causesOutcome((id13, 2/100), I) ← (TC3.3)
holds(((toss, true), I)).
performed(toss, 1). (TC4)
where, informally, the set of clauses (TC0) is the translation of the three sorts F , A and I;
(TC1), (TC2) and (TC4) are the translation of (C1), (C2) and (C4) respectively; (TC3.1),
(TC3.2) and (TC3.3) together give the translation of (C3), and each of them corresponds to
an outcome in the corresponding c-proposition;
Since in logic programming lowercase letters are conventionally used for constants, we
switch to that convention by letting lower case letters be the logic programming counter-
parts of (upper case) constants in PEC so that e.g. f is regarded as the translated fluent F .
Furthermore, literals of the form X = V are translated into pairs of the form (x, v).
The three sorts F , A and I are translated to the three sets {fluent(f) | F ∈ F},
{action(a) | A ∈ A} and {instant(i) | I ∈ I} respectively (see e.g. (TC0) in Example
19).
Let c be a c-proposition of the generic form (2):
θ causes-one-of {O1, O2, . . . , Om}
but first considering the case where θ is a conjunction of the form X1 = V1 ∧ · · · ∧Xj =
Vj . Given a conjunction θ as before, we write holds([θ]@I) as a shorthand for the logic
programming conjunction
holds(((x1, v1), I)), . . . , holds(((xj , vj), I)).
Fix an enumeration (without repetitions) of all the c-propositions in D, and let c be the
nth proposition occurring in such enumeration. Then, c is translated to:
{ belongsTo((x, v), idni ) | i = 1, . . . ,m,X = V ∈ χ(Oi) }
∪{ causesOutcome((idni , p), I)← holds(θ, I) |
i = 1, . . . ,m, , P = π(Oi) }
where idn1 , . . . , id
n
m are new constants in the underlying ASP language. We write CD for
the set of all translated c-propositions in D.
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Example 20. The clauses (TC3.1), (TC3.2) and (TC3.3) are the translation of the c-
proposition (C2) from Example 4.
As a further example, consider the c-proposition (A5) as in Example 5, and notice that
two outcomes occur in it, i.e. ({Bacteria = Absent,Rash = Absent}, 1/13) and (∅, 4/13).
If we fix the enumeration of c-propositions inDA such that (A4) is first and (A5) is second,
this c-proposition is translated to:
belongsTo((bacteria, absent), id21). (TA5.1)
belongsTo((rash, absent), id21).
causesOutcome((id21, 1/13), I) ←
holds((takesMedicine, true), I),
holds((bacteria, resistant), I).
causesOutcome((id22, 4/13), I) ← (TA5.2)
holds((takesMedicine, true), I),
holds((bacteria, resistant), I).
If θ is not a conjunction of literals, then represent it in Disjunctive Normal Form, i.e. in
the form θ1 ∨ · · · ∨ θn with θ1, . . . , θn conjunctions of literals, and then for each rule write
the precondition of each causes-one-of clause in the disjunctive form:
holds([θ1]@I); . . . ; holds([θn]@I).
The translation of i-propositions works in a very similar way: if J is an i-proposition
of the general form (3):
initially-one-of {O1, O2, . . . , Om}
then its translation is given by the following set of clauses:
{ belongsTo((x, v), id0i ) | i = 1, . . . ,m,X = V ∈ χ(Oi) }
∪{ initialCondition((id0i , p)) | i = 1, . . . ,m, P = π(Oi) }
and we write ID for the set of all translated i-propositions in D.
Example 21. An example of translated i-proposition is the set of clauses (TC2), that trans-
late (C2) as in Example 19.
The i-proposition (A3) from Example 5 is translated to:
belongsTo((bacteria,weak), id01). (TA3.1)
belongsTo((rash, present), id01).
initialCondition((id01, 9/10)).
belongsTo((bacteria, absent), id02). (TA3.2)
belongsTo((rash, present), id02).
initialCondition((id02, 1/10)).
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Finally, the translation of p-propositions and v-propositions is straightforward: any
generic p-proposition of the form (4) is translated to
performed(a, i).
and we write PD for the set of all translated p-propositions in D, while any v-proposition
of the form (1) is translated to:
{ possVal(f, vi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
and we write VD for the set of all translated v-propositions in D.
Example 22. The v-proposition (C1) and p-proposition (C4) from from Example 4 are
translated to (TC1) and (TC4) as in Example 19, respectively, while (A1), (A2), (A6), (A7)
from Example 5 are translated to:
possVal(bacteria,weak). (TA1)
possVal(bacteria, resistant).
possVal(bacteria, absent).
possVal(rash, present). (TA2)
possVal(rash, absent).
performed(takesMedicine, 1). (TA6)
performed(takesMedicine, 3). (TA7)
Since PD and VD contain only ground facts which clearly correspond to their seman-
tic counterparts (i.e., p-propositions and v-propositions) we are not going to discuss their
correctness in close detail.
We write ΠD for the set of translated propositions from D, e.g. if DC is the coin toss
domain, ΠDC = (TC0–4).
3.2 Translation of the domain-independent part
We define the domain-independent part of our theory to be:
possVal(A, true)← action(A). (PEC1)
possVal(A, false)← action(A).
fluentOrAction(X)← fluent(X); action(X). (PEC2)
literal((X,V ))← possVal(X,V ). (PEC3)
iLiteral((L, I))← literal(L), instant(I). (PEC4)
definitelyPerformed(A, I)← performed(A, I, 1). (PEC5)
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possiblyPerformed(A, I)← performed(A, I, P ). (PEC6)
1{ holds(((X,V ), I)) : iLiteral(((X,V ), I)) }1 (PEC7)
← instant(I), fluentOrAction(X).
inOcc(I)← instant(I), causesOutcome(O, I). (PEC8)
1{ effectChoice(O, I) : causesOutcome(O, I) }1 (PEC9)
← inOcc(I).
1{ initialChoice(O) : initialCondition(O) }1. (PEC10)
⊥ ← action(A), instant(I), (PEC11)
holds(((A, true), I)), not possiblyPerformed(A, I).
⊥ ← action(A), instant(I), (PEC12)
holds(((A, false), I)), definitelyPerformed(A, I).
⊥ ← initialChoice((S,P )), literal(L), (PEC13)
belongsTo(L,S), not holds((L, 0)).
⊥ ← instant(I), effectChoice((X,P ), I), (PEC14)
fluent(F ), belongsTo((F, V ),X),
not holds(((F, V ), I + 1)), I < maxinst.
⊥ ← instant(I), fluent(F ), not holds(((F, V ), I)), (PEC15)
effectChoice((X,P ), I), not belongsTo((F, V ),X),
holds(((F, V ), I + 1)), I < maxinst.
⊥ ← fluent(F ), instant(I), holds(((F, V ), I)), (PEC16)
not inOcc(I), not holds(((F, V ), I + 1)),
I < maxinst.
eval(A, I, P )← action(A), instant(I), (PEC17)
performed(A, I, P ), holds(((A, true), I)).
eval(A, I, 1 − P )← action(A), instant(I), (PEC18)
performed(A, I, P ), holds(((A, false), I)).
(PEC1–4) implement the basic predicates and sorts of PEC, namely: (PEC1) states
that actions are boolean; (PEC2) defines a characteristic predicate for F ∪ A; (PEC3) and
(PEC4) define literals and i-literals, respectively. (PEC5) and (PEC6) define the two auxil-
iary predicates definitelyPerformed and possiblyPerformed representing the sets of actions
and instants such that A is certainly performed at I (i.e., with probability 1) and such that A
might have been performed at I (i.e., with a probability greater than 0) respectively. Prov-
ing that (PEC1–6) correctly characterise the sorts and sets they stand for is trivial and is
omitted here.
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Intuitively, axioms (PEC7–18) correspond to the definitions introduced in the previ-
ous section, namely: (PEC7) corresponds to Definition 14, (PEC8) defines a characteris-
tic predicate for occ as in Definition 17, (PEC9) and (PEC14–16) correspond to justified
change, (PEC10) and (PEC13) corresponds to the initial condition, (PEC11) and (PEC12)
correspond to CWA for actions.
We denote the domain-independent part of our theory, i.e. (PEC1–18), by ΠI . Notice
that axioms (PEC11–16) are constraints, and in the following will be referred to as ΠC .
4 Correctness
We now show that the provided translation is sound and complete with respect to the def-
initions given in the previous sections. This proof relies on the Splitting Theorem [10], a
useful tool to obtain the answer sets of a ground program. Informally, a set U of atoms
is a splitting set for a program Π if, for every rule in Π, if U contains some atom in the
head of such rule, then it also contains all the atoms occurring in that rule. For instance,
if Π′ = {a ← not b, b ← c, c} then {a, b, c}, ∅, {b, c} and {c} are splitting sets for Π′,
whereas {a, b}, {a} and {b} are not.
A splitting set U splits an answer set program Π into a bottom program botU (Π) and a
top program topU (Π) = Π \ botU (Π). With the program Π
′ defined as above, U ′ = {c}
splits Π′ into botU ′(Π
′) = {c} and topU ′(Π
′) = {a← not b, b← c}.
The splitting set theorem states that the answer sets ofΠ are exactly those that can be ex-
pressed asX ∪Y forX an answer set of botU (Π) and Y an answer set of eU (topU (Π),X),
where eU (Π, Z) for a generic program Π, set of atoms U and answer set Z denotes the
partial evaluation of the program Π w.r.t. U which is defined as follows: a rule r is in
eU (Π, Z) if and only if there exists a rule r
′ ∈ Π such that all literals in the body of r′ with
at least an atom of U occurring in them are also in Z , and the rule r is obtained from r′ by
removing all the occurrences of such literals. If we consider Π′ and U ′ again and let X ′ be
the only answer set {c} of botU ′(Π
′) = {c}, Π′′ = eU ′(topU ′(Π
′),X ′) = {a ← not b, b}
and notice that now we can split Π′′ itself. If we let U ′′ = {b}, then botU ′′(Π
′′) = {b}
and Π′′′ = eU ′′(topU ′′(Π
′′),X ′′) = ∅ for the only answer set X ′′ = {b} of botU ′′(Π
′′).
The answer sets of the original program Π′ can now be obtained as X ′ ∪X ′′ ∪X ′′′, where
X ′ = {c} is the answer set of botU ′(Π
′), X ′′ = {b} is the answer set of botU ′′(Π
′′) = {c}
andX ′′′ = ∅ is the answer set of Π′′′. Then, the program Π′ has only one answer set {b, c}.
In the following, we will use the fact that answer sets of a choice rule {a1, . . . , an}
are the power set {∅, {a1}, . . . , {an}, {a1, a2}, . . . , {a1, . . . , an}}, and that answer sets
of a constrained choice rule X{a1, . . . , an}Y are the answer sets of {a1, . . . , an} with
cardinality ≥ X and ≤ Y . Also, we use the fact that the only answer set of the pro-
gram {p(X) : q(X), q(a1), . . . , q(an)}, where p(X) : q(X) is called a conditional literal,
is {p(a1), . . . , p(an), q(a1), . . . , q(an)}. Notice that conditional literal and choice rules
can be combined so that e.g. answer sets of the program {q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), 1{p(X) :
q(a,X)}1} are {q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), p(b)} and {q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), p(c)}. Finally,
constraints are used to eliminate answer sets that satisfy its body, e.g. answer sets
of the program {q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), 1{p(X) : q(a,X)}1,⊥ ← p(b)} are the answer
sets of {q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), 1{p(X) : q(a,X)}1} that do not satisfy p(b), hence
{q(a, b), q(a, c), q(b, c), p(c)} is its only answer set.
The splitting set theorem can only be applied to ground programs, hence in the fol-
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lowing we will interpret non-ground clauses as shorthand for the set of all their ground
instances, e.g. the clause p(X) ← q(X,Y ) from the program {p(X) ← q(X,Y ), q(a, b)}
is shorthand for the set {p(a)← q(a, a), p(a)← q(a, b), p(b)← q(b, a), p(b) ← q(b, b)}.
Before proving the correctness of the implementation, we need to define a correspon-
dence between answer sets and traces. This is the aim of the following definitions:
Definition 37 (Manifest Choice Element). We say that the choice element (X˜, P+)@I
is manifest in the answer set Z if and only if there exists a symbol id such that
effectChoice((id, p+), i) ∈ Z and such that L ∈ X˜ if and only if belongsTo(l, id) ∈ Z
(recall that p+, i and l are the ASP representations of P+, I and L respectively).
Definition 38 (Trace of an answer set). The trace of an answer set Z is the trace
〈O ⊲⊳@ ⊲
⊳, O1@I1, . . . , On@In〉 where O ⊲⊳@ ⊲
⊳, O1@I1, . . . , On@In are exactly the manifest
choice elements in Z ordered according to instants I1, . . . , In.
Proposition 4. A candidate trace tr is a trace of D if and only if there exists an answer set
Ztr of ΠD ∪ΠI such that tr is a trace of Ztr.
Proof. Let Π be the ground program obtained by grounding ΠD ∪ ΠI . We split Π with
respect to the set U of all possible groundings of the predicates fluent, action, instant and
possVal. The bottom botU (Π) is guaranteed by the translation process to have a unique
answer set ZL which includes a correct representation of the domain language L, i.e. of the
three sorts F , A and I and of the function vals (note that the definition of V is implicitly
derived from that of vals and that our implementation is restricted to the case where≤=≤N
and 0¯ = 0).
We now split the partially evaluated top Π(1) = eU (topU (Π), ZL) using the set U
(1)
consisting of all possible groundings of the predicate holds. The bottom botU (1)(Π
(1))
consists only of (PEC7) and has answer sets that correspond to any possible world in the
domain language, i.e., (PEC7) generates every possible function from instants to states,
hence for a particular world W ∈ W we denote by ZW the corresponding answer set of
botU (1)(Π
(1)), and we are allowed to interpret holds(((x, v), i)) ∈ ZW as X=V ∈W (I).
Notice that for any fixed W ∈ W the three sets of propositions Π(2) =
eU (1)((PEC8–9) ∪ CD, ZW ), Π
(3) = eU (1)((PEC10) ∪ ID, ZW ) and Π
(4) =
eU (1)((PEC17–18) ∪ PD, ZW ) are independent of each other so we can evaluate their an-
swer sets separately.
We start with the set Π(2). If a c-proposition c =“θ causes-one-of {O1, O2, . . . , Om}”
in D is activated at I in W w.r.t. D, i.e. W ||= [θ]@I , then also the preconditions of
the translated c-proposition in CD are satisfied (as ZW correctly represents W ), and Π
(2)
will contain the facts causesOutcome((idnj , p), i) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and c being the nth
c-proposition in the enumeration fixed during the translation process (see Section 3.1 for
reference), alongside the corresponding belongsTo facts in CD which we assume correctly
represent the ∈ relation for outcomes, i.e., belongsTo((x, v), idnj ) ∈ Π
(2) if and only if
X=V ∈ Oj . The converse is a straightforward inversion of this reasoning.
For a fixed I , if we denote by CW,I the set of facts of the form
causesOutcome((idnj , p), i) that are in Π
(2), what we have just shown yields:
CW,I ⇔ a cause occurs inW at I (19)
If we now let U (2) be a splitting set such that it contains all possible groundings of the
causesOutcome predicate, we get that the the only answer set of botU (2)(Π
(2)) isBC ∪CW ,
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where BC is the set of belongsTo facts contained in CD and CW is defined as:
CW =
⋃
I∈I
CW,I (20)
The partially evaluated top Π
(2)
1 = eU (2)(Π
(2), BC ∪CW ) includes the following set of
facts:
OW = {inOcc(i) | ∃o : causesOutcome(o, i) ∈ CW } = {inOcc(i) | I ∈ I, CW,I 6= ∅}
= {inOcc(i) | a cause occurs inW at I}
where we have used Equation (19) to derive the last equality. Therefore, we can interpret
inOcc(i) ∈ OW as I ∈ inOccD(W ).
Let U
(2)
1 be the splitting set consisting of all possible groundings of inOcc. The only
answer set of bot
U
(2)
1
(Π
(2)
1 ) isOW , and we now need to evaluate and find the answer sets of
Π
(2)
2 = eU (2)1
(top
U
(2)
1
(Π
(2)
1 ), OW ) which now consists only of a partially evaluated (PEC7).
The role of (PEC7) is to implement the effectChoice function. Indeed, for each instant
I such that I ∈ occD(W ), exactly one atom of the form effectChoice(o, i) is included in an
answer set ofΠ
(2)
2 for some o such that causesOutcome(o, i) ∈ CW . Since this is consistent
with definition 19, we can interpret effectChoice(o, i) as its intended semantic counterpart
ec(I) = O where ec is an effect choice function for W w.r.t. D. For an effect choice
function ec forW w.r.t. D, we call the corresponding answer set that encodes it Eec.
Applying the splitting theorem, we can now conclude that answer sets of Π(2) are ex-
actly those given by the set {BC ∪ CW ∪ OW ∪ Eec | ec is an effect choice function for
W w.r.t. D}.
Answer sets of Π(3) correspond to the initialChoice constant and can be worked out in
a similar way as in the effect choice function case. It can be shown that initialChoice(o)
correctly represents an initial choice ic as in definition 20, and answer sets ofΠ(3) are given
by ID ∪ Iic, where the singleton set Iic consists only of an encoded ic for an initial choice
ic w.r.t. D.
Finally we need to derive answer sets of Π(4). We split it using U (4) consisting of all
performed ground facts. The bottom botU (4)(Π
(4)) has answer set PD itself (notice that
PD contains only ground facts), and we are left with calculating answer sets of Π
(4)
1 =
eU (4)(topU (4)(Π
(4), PD), PD). The aim of eval is that of implementing Equation (8). It is
important to notice here that, thanks to requirement iv) in Definition 11, it is possible to
label a p-proposition “A performed-at I with-prob P+” using only A and I . Comparing
Equation (8) with (PEC17–18) immediately gives that the only answer set of Π(4) is PD ∪
EvW where
EvW =
{
eval(a, i, p) | A ∈ A, I ∈ I, “A performed-at I with-prob P+” ∈ D,
P = P+ ifW ||= [A]@I, P = 1− P+ otherwise
}
.
We are now able to calculate the answer sets of the whole program Π \ ΠC , which are
given by the set
{
ZL ∪ZW ∪BC ∪CW ∪OW ∪Eec ∪ ID ∪ Iic ∪PD ∪EvW , forW ∈ W ,
an effect choice ec forW w.r.t. D and an initial choice ic w.r.t. D
}
Finally, we take into account the constraints ΠC , whose effect is that of implement-
ing the Closed World Assumption and the effects of initialisation and persistence. Since
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(PEC11–16) are constraints, they eliminate those answer sets of Π \ ΠC that satisfy their
bodies.
If we let ZW be the world encoded in an answer set Z of Π \ ΠC , (PEC11) and
(PEC12) ensure that:
holds(((a, true), i)) ∈ ZW ⇒ ∃p > 0, performed(a, i, p) ∈ ΠD
⇔ “A performed-at I with-prob P+” ∈ D
and, conversely
holds(((a, false), i)) ∈ ZW ⇒ performed(a, i, 1) ∈ ΠD
⇔ “A performed-at I with-prob 1” ∈ D
therefore the world encoded in ZW must satisfy CWA, i.e. definition 16.
Let now “initially-one-of (O1, O2, . . . , Om)” be an i-proposition in D and ZW be as
before. (PEC14) makes sure that:
holds(((f, v), 0)) ∈ ZW ⇔ ∃s : {initialChoice((s, p)), belongsTo((f, v), s)} ⊆ ΠD ⇔
∃O : O ∈ {O1, . . . , Om}, S˜ = χ(O), [F = V ] ∈ S˜.
which satisfies the initial condition, i.e. definition 18.
Finally we consider (PEC14–16). Let I, I ′ be two instants with I < I ′ as in definition
23, consider the world encoded in ZW and let W (I)↾F = S˜ and W (I
′)↾F = S˜′. As-
sume that the effectChoice function encoded in Z maps instants in inOccD(W ) ∩ [I, I
′)
to outcomes O1, O2, . . . , On. Axiom (PEC16) makes sure that S˜ cannot be altered if
I /∈ inOccD(W ). Therefore S˜ can only change at instants I ∈ inOccD(W ). We now
show that S˜′ is actually equal to S˜ ⊕ O1 ⊕ O2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ On. If not, and considering that
our implementation is restricted to a finite set of instants, either (i) there is a fluent lit-
eral L ∈ χ(O) for some O ∈ {O1, O2, . . . , On} and an instant I
′′ ∈ [I, I ′) such that
L ∈ χ(O) but L /∈ W (I ′′ + 1), or (ii) for some O ∈ {O1, O2, . . . , On} and a fluent literal
L = [F = V ] such that L /∈ O and L /∈ W (I ′′), L ∈ W (I ′′ + 1). Both (i) and (ii)
are forbidden by (PEC15) and (PEC16) respectively, by considering that the answer set Z
correctly represents the semantic objects that it encodes.
5 Related Work
Although there is existing work on probabilistic reasoning about actions, most is based
on Reiter’s variant of Situation Calculus (SC) [16], with focus on hypothetical rather than
narrative reasoning. An exception is Prob-EC (see below).
Of the SC approaches, the Bacchus-Halpern-Levesque framework [1] is a cornerstone
of early work integrating probabilistic knowledge with logical formalisms for reasoning
about actions, and incorporates epistemic notions such as sensing actions. The Probabilis-
tic Situation Calculus (PSC) [13] is extended to deal with knowledge-producing actions
in [12]. A reasoning system based on PSC able to perform temporal projection has been
implemented by the authors in Wolfram Mathematica [19] and uses Monte Carlo methods
for tractability. The language PAL [2] focuses on building an elaboration tolerant repre-
sentation for Markov Decision Processes. It is based on Language A [5] and oriented to
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counterfactual reasoning and observation assimilation. PAL uses two kinds of unknown
variables – inertial and non-inertial – to achieve an elaboration tolerant representation of
domains. The action language E+ [7], based on C+ [6], supports both non-deterministic
and probabilistic actions. Its main focus is on providing algorithms for the efficient com-
putation of plans.
To our knowledge, the Probabilistic Logic Programming Event Calculus (Prob-
EC) [18] is the only EC-style language in this class of formalisms other than PEC able
to support reasoning about explicit event occurrences (narratives). Unlike our framework,
which has its own bespoke semantics, Prob-EC is a logic programming framework based
on the probabilistic logic programming language ProbLog [3] and therefore inherits and ex-
ploits its semantics. In [18] Prob-EC is applied to human activity recognition. The authors
describe how a set of long-term activities (LTAs) can be detected from a set of short-term
activities (STAs). Such STAs, which constitute the input to the system, are treated as events
happening at given instants and have probabilities attached. This is a somewhat different
approach than PEC’s, motivated by its application to activity recognition, analogous to at-
taching probabilities to p-propositions (rather than i- and c-propositions). In other words
Prob-EC’s focus is on representing probabilistic knowledge about event occurrences rather
than about their general causal effects.
6 Summary
In this work, we present PEC, an EC variant for reasoning about actions in a narrative
domain where actions can have probabilistic outcomes, and illustrated how for a wide sub-
class of domains it can be implemented in ASP in a sound and complete way. Unlike Prob-
EC [18] which follows the “logic programming” tradition, our formalism belongs to the
“action language” tradition (originating in [5], but see also [8] for the first EC style action
language), and therefore its own specialised semantics. This makes of PEC portable in the
sense that it is independent of any particular computational implementation. Its semantics
is defined in terms of (possible) worlds, with a view to adding epistemic features at a later
date (see e.g. [14], [17]).
In our initial experimentation with adding epistemic features to PEC, we have focused
on representing imperfect sensing actions and actions conditioned on knowledge acquired
during the progression of the narrative. These features are similar to those in the EFEC
extension of FEC [11]. We envisage including s-propositions such as
See senses Coin with-accuracies
(
0.9 0.1
0.3 0.7
)
which represents that our coin-tossing robot can imperfectly sense the current face showing
on the coin, and conditional p-propositions such as
Toss performed-at 2 if-believes (Coin=Tails, (0.65, 1])
which represents that the robot will toss again if it believes with a greater than 65% prob-
ability that the first toss resulted in Tails. Preliminary results indicate that our possible
worlds semantics can be readily extended to cover these notions.
There are several other ways in which the present work can be continued. For instance,
the problem of elaboration tolerance, which plays an important role in classical reasoning
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about actions, needs to be reviewed and solved in our setting. This problem has already
been tackled in [2], but needs to be restated in our framework due to the different way
in which we introduce probabilities in PEC. A related point is that of underspecification,
i.e. what an agent can reasonably infer from a domain in which the initial conditions and
the effects of actions are not entirely specified (even probabilistically). Finally, in our
view a crucial point is that of computational efficiency. Indeed, the intractability of several
computational problems arising in this setting (such as temporal projection) suggests that
techniques (e.g. Monte Carlo Markov Chain) are needed to efficiently approximate the
correct answer to a given query with an appropriate degree of confidence.
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